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Predictability lost:  
the German political scene after the elections
Artur Ciechanowicz
Both in Germany and abroad, the commentary on the recent elections in Germany has 
been dominated by the analysis of the results scored by the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the country. 
The party had been almost certain to make it to the Bundestag long before the 24 Septem-
ber elections: the result it has just scored was only slightly better than what the pre-election 
polls suggested. The results scored by the two mass parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, were 
much worse than the poll predictions. It is these parties’ results that offer an insight into the 
evolution of German voters’ political identities. Moreover, they are of key importance when 
assessing and predicting the upcoming events on the German political scene. In the short 
term, it is unlikely that the old parties will break up or that new ones will emerge. However, it 
is likely that the traditional mass parties will continue to lose their electoral base. Parties with 
a distinct ideology such as the AfD, which is likely to be an uncompromising opposition party, 
may continue to gain ground. Due to the AfD’s presence in the Bundestag, the language of 
public debate in Germany is likely to become increasingly aggressive, and the narratives of the 
AfD and the remaining parties are diverging to an ever greater extent.
The crisis of the mass parties
The election results mainly indicate the magni-
tude of the crisis affecting the two mass parties 
(Volksparteien), the CDU and the SPD. Despite 
their victory, the Christian Democrats’ result 
turned out to be much worse than in 2013 
(a drop of 8.9%). Stanislaw Tillich, the prime mi-
nister of Saxony and a close party collaborator 
of Angela Merkel, said that the Christian Demo-
crats had failed to tackle the issues which the 
public is really concerned about. He called for 
a new start, took responsibility for the CDU’s 
poor result in Saxony, and stepped down from 
the office of prime minister. The SPD, for its 
part, has scored its worst result since the end of 
World War II. To avoid being held accountable 
for the defeat, during the post-election evening 
the head of the Social Democratic party chose 
to retreat by advancing, and announced that 
under his leadership the party would go into 
opposition. By doing so, he focused the party’s 
internal debate on programme issues instead of 
personnel issues.
The CDU and the SPD began to lose their du-
opoly on the German political scene in the 
first decade of the 21st century. Back in 1990, 
the Christian Democrats and the Social Demo-
crats had 790,000 and 943,000 members re-
spectively, whereas in 2016 those figures were 
431,000 and 432,000. In recent years, the dwin-
dling of their stable electorate has been accom-
panied by an increase in the proportion of vo-
ters who make their electoral decisions at the 
last minute, guided by their emotions. A week 
ahead of the recent elections to the Bundestag, 
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40% of voters did not know what party they 
would vote for; back in 1980, the correspon-
ding proportion was 20%. 
The German voters’ increasingly weak loyalty 
towards the two political giants results from 
a number of factors:
1. Since 2005 the manifestos of the SPD and 
the Greens have been undergoing an ongoing 
unification. This is evident, for example, in the 
introduction of the minimum wage, dual citi-
zenship, a professional army, rescuing the euro-
zone and the energy transformation program-
me. These initiatives have enabled the Christian 
Democrats to build a strong position in the 
centre of the political scene. At the same time, 
it has made it increasingly difficult to tell the 
difference between the manifestos of the CDU 
and the SPD, and even the Greens. This line of 
development has been a disappointment for 
conservative CDU voters. In 2013, an alternative 
emerged for them in the form of the AfD. Rese-
arch on the transfer of voters indicates that the 
biggest number of voters this anti-immigrant 
and anti-Islamic party has seized from other 
parties were former CDU voters (the research 
did not cover the mobilisation of traditional 
non-voters). Detailed polls regarding the main 
characteristics of specific parties confirm the 
lack of a clear-cut profile for the mass parties: 
50% of Germans believe that Angela Merkel is 
the CDU/CSU’s main asset, while at the same 
time 48% say that it is difficult to clearly define 
her political views. For 74% of the respondents, 
the SPD is a party which does not speak of any-
thing that could be of interest to the public. As 
many as 81% of the respondents argue that the 
post-Communist, extreme left-wing Left Party 
is unable to solve any problems, but at least it 
calls a spade a spade; and 49% say that the AfD 
understands the problem of insecurity many 
Germans experience and treats it seriously1. 
2. The reforms of the job market and the wel-
fare system known as Agenda 2010, carried out 
by Gerhard Schröder (SPD), brought an impro-
vement of Germany’s economic situation. Ho-
wever, traditional SPD voters considered them 
a betrayal of leftist ideals, and since then the 
Social Democrats have failed to regain their 
former credibility and trust. This is particularly 
important in the context of the fact that since 
2007 they have had a strong political compe-
titor in the form of the Left Party, which looks 
for votes from groups that consider themselves 
socially excluded.
3. As a result of demographic, social and eco-
nomic changes, the electorates of the two 
mass parties have become increasingly similar 
to each other. The traditional, stereotype-based 
division, according to which the working class 
votes for the SPD and the small-town middle 
class votes for the CDU, is no longer confirmed 
by research data2. Research conducted by the 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) 
indicated that the main differences involve the 
place of residence (the SPD has more voters in 
urban areas) and the voters’ fears (according 
to CDU voters, the biggest threats to Germany 
are crime and migrations, whereas according to 
SPD voters, it is climate change). The political 
affiliations of an increasing proportion of vo-
ters are not determined by their profession or 
religion but by other social characteristics and 
aspirations. The fact of formally belonging to 
the working class, combined with a relatively 
high standard of living typical of the middle 
class, has caused the traditional proletarian 
1 Aussagen zu den Parteien, https://wahl.tagesschau.de/
wahlen/2017-09-24-BT-DE/umfrage-aussagen.shtml
2 Wählerschaft der Parteien, DIW, 19 July 2017. https://
www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01. 
c.562050.de/17-29.pdf
The fact of formally belonging to the work-
ing class, combined with a relatively high 
standard of living typical of the middle 
class, has caused the traditional proletar-
ian ethos to dwindle rapidly.
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ethos to dwindle rapidly. Similarly, in the con-
text of a society becoming increasingly secula-
rised, the fact of formally belonging to a given 
church is no longer a criterion which determi-
nes how one votes.
4. Due to intra-party differences between the 
politicians active at state level and at federal le-
vel, voters are losing orientation as regards the 
parties’ political profiles. Both the CDU and the 
SPD tolerate individuals within their ranks who 
frequently have totally opposite views. Such in-
ternal divisions are best illustrated by the exam-
ple of state elections in which the views of local 
activists, regarding for example migration po-
licy, are frequently considerably different from 
the concepts supported by federal-level politi-
cians. For example, ahead of the 2016 elections 
in the North Rhine-Palatinate, Julia Klöckner, 
the head of the local CDU organisation, open-
ly criticised Angela Merkel’s policy during the 
migration crisis. Thilo Sarrazin, a former SPD 
politician, is one of the most prominent and 
controversial critics of the ‘multi-kulti’ concept 
of the state open to immigrants.
It is noteworthy that the weakening trends re-
corded for the mass parties has also affected 
those groups which have the status of mass 
parties in selected regions instead of the coun-
try as a whole, namely the CSU in Bavaria and 
the Left Party in the eastern part of Germany. 
The CSU, which is the CDU’s more conservative 
(in its world outlook) and more pro-social sister 
party, scored 38.8% of the votes in the elec-
tions to the Bundestag in Bavaria. This result is 
better than the overall result of the Christian 
Democrats nationwide, but it is still below the 
expectations of the party, which considers itself 
a ‘state party’ (Staatspartei)3 in its federal state, 
and won 49.3% of the votes there four years 
ago. The relatively poor result scored by the 
CSU was due to the actions of Horst Seehofer, 
the prime minister of Bavaria and head of the 
CSU, during the migration crisis, when he criti-
cised Angela Merkel’s policy. Paradoxically, he 
3 Or that it is predestined to govern Bavaria on its own.
lost votes from both opponents and supporters 
of the Chancellor. According to the former gro-
up, he was too lenient, whereas according to 
the latter he was dishonest towards Ms Merkel. 
This translated into increased support for the 
anti-immigrant AfD and the pro-immigrant Left 
Party and the Greens.
In the eastern part of Germany, the Left Party 
has lost its status as the second most promi-
nent political force (after the CDU), with the 
AfD replacing it. Research shows that previous 
Left Party voters chose the AfD because they 
were discouraged by the Left Party’s excessively 
pro-immigrant views.
The sluggish changes within the big parties
The crisis affecting the CDU and the SPD does 
not mean that there is no longer room for 
mass parties on the German political scene. 
The attempt – despite the formal differences 
in party manifestos – to create a government 
coalition composed of the CDU/CSU, the FDP 
and the Greens, as well as the support this con-
figuration recently enjoyed (57%, an increase 
of 34% compared to a poll conducted ahead 
of the elections), suggest that the present par-
ty situation does not reflect the real divisions 
in German society. The poll reflects a situation 
in which the liberal wing of the CDU has more 
in common with the Greens, the conservative 
wing of the SPD and the freedom-oriented fac-
tion of the FDP, than with the CSU or the more 
conservative members of Angela Merkel’s CDU.
It is unlikely that in the immediate future the 
old parties will break up, or that new parties 
In the eastern part of Germany, the Left 
Party has lost its status as the second 
most prominent political force (after the 
CDU). Discouraged by the party’s exces-
sive pro-immigrant views, its former vot-
ers chose to support the AfD.
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will emerge. The mass parties will continue 
to try to combine their divergent ideological 
views. They will tolerate many different lines 
of thinking, especially at the state level, and 
make tactical gestures towards those voters 
who are more inclined to support the right and 
left sides of the political scene respectively. 
Immediately after the elections, several CDU 
members called on the party to become more 
open to right-wing voters, and even to replace 
Angela Merkel with a new party head4. Howe-
ver, a poll conducted among the present par-
ty supporters showed that 33% of CDU voters 
favour this type of rightward turn, and 55% are 
against it. 98% of the surveyed group do not 
want any changes in the party leadership5. The-
se results have been welcomed by the party’s 
liberal wing because they strengthen Angela 
Merkel’s position ahead of coalition talks. 
The situation within the SPD is more complex. 
Schulz has managed to postpone personnel 
debates and the assessment of the reasons for 
the party’s electoral defeat, but only until De-
cember 2017 at the latest. This is when the party 
members will hold a federal-level convention. 
To maintain his post as head of the SPD, Schulz 
will have to agree to personnel and program-
me concessions proposed by the party’s radical 
left wing. This group is satisfied with the fact 
that the party is now in opposition, but at the 
same time it is demanding that the party clearly 
condemn Agenda 2010, and has requested per-
4 Konservativer Flügel fordert neuen CDU-Chef, Die 
Welt, 26 September 2017, https://www.welt.de/poli-
tik/deutschland/article169059522/Konservativer-Flue-
gel-fordert-neuen-CDU-Chef.html
5 Darum muss Merkel den rechten CDU-Rand nicht fürcht-
en, 2 October 2017, http://www.rp-online.de/politik/
deutschland/union-darum-muss-angela-merkel-den-re-
chten-cdu-rand-nicht-fuerchten-aid-1.7119585
sonnel changes in the party’s governing bodies. 
Schulz is aware that an excessively hard turn to 
the left will discourage further moderate voters 
from the SPD, while not necessarily meaning that 
the portion of its former electorate that chose to 
support the Left Party could be regained.
Regardless of what decisions will be taken in 
the short term, the two parties will have to 
tackle a problem which has already become 
evident: fewer votes cast in favour of specific 
parties are tantamount to smaller state subsi-
dies and, as a result, less potential to retain the 
present voters and win new ones6. This system 
would favour parties with a strong ideology, 
such as the Greens, the Left Party and the AfD 
(and possibly the CSU, if the Bavarians distance 
themselves from Chancellor Merkel). 
The party non grata
The SPD will be the biggest opposition ca-
ucus in parliament, but it is the AfD that will 
be the real opposition in the present political 
situation. The AfD was created in 2013 as an 
anti-establishment party opposing aid program-
mes for eurozone countries such as Greece. Over 
four years, it has managed to bring its repre-
sentatives into the European Parliament and to 
14 of the 16 local parliaments in Germany. In the 
meantime, the party, which was initially esta-
blished by economics professors who had beco-
me disenchanted with the Christian Democrats 
and the FDP, has become strongly rightwards-o-
riented, and won over its voters by using anti-im-
migrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric.
The AfD is the only party to have achieved 
a clear success in the elections to the Bundestag. 
The party has brought 94 deputies into parlia-
ment despite its internal conflicts, attempts to 
isolate it, and a certain hostility on the part of 
6 The SPD’s treasurer Dietmar Nietan said that due to the 
party’s poorest electoral result in its history, which will 
translate into lower state subsidies, the Social Demo-
crats’ budget will record a deficit of around €1 million. 
Therefore, it is being suggested that the number of 
events organised by the SPD be reduced, and aid of-
fered to party organisations in locations where the party 
scores very few votes be cut.
To maintain his post as head of the SPD, 
Schulz will have to agree to personnel and 
programme concessions proposed by the 
party’s radical left wing.
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mainstream media. This was possible not only 
due to the ‘social-democratisation’ of the CDU 
and the opening up of a niche on the right of 
the political scene. In its campaign, the AfD re-
ferred to certain issues which broke taboos and 
tested the boundaries of political correctness. 
At the same time, it took care to present itself 
as a party with no links to the neo-Nazis (the 
party’s procedures provide for checking the 
biographies of candidate members for any af-
filiation to neo-Nazi organisations), although 
it has never condemned such groups en bloc. 
Alongside this, the party leaders regularly em-
phasised the importance of the problem of cri-
mes committed by immigrants, and demanded 
that the heroic behaviour of the ‘German sol-
dier’ in two world wars be honoured. It would 
be no exaggeration to argue that it is becau-
se of the AfD that such attitudes are gaining 
ground and are no longer a source of shame. 
This trend is also a manifestation of the objec-
tions of increasingly numerous groups of voters 
towards the identity policy pursued by Angela 
Merkel, according to which nationality is more 
of a formal term synonymous with citizenship. 
At the same time, Chancellor Merkel, the main-
stream parties and media have lost the so-cal-
led Deutungshoheit, that is, the monopoly on 
how to interpret events. This was possible due 
to the spread of electronic media which have 
absorbed the anti-establishment narrative. The 
state’s institutions and media are no longer 
able to successfully criticise their opponents. 
On the contrary, attempts to criticise only con-
firm the AfD’s narrative of a corrupt system that 
completely ignores the fears of the German pu-
blic7. This leads to the ongoing polarisation of 
society, symbolised by demonstrations held by 
supporters and opponents of the plan to take 
in migrants, during which both sides had the 
same slogan on their banners: Wir sind das Volk 
(We are the nation)8.
The AfD’s very presence in the Bundestag has 
limited Angela Merkel’s room for manoeuvre, 
and the Chancellor has been forced to negotiate 
a three-party coalition. In parliament, the AfD, 
as the third biggest political force, is able to in-
fluence the German public debate and build up 
its institutional position. Aside from the office of 
vice-president of the Bundestag and the posts 
of the heads of parliamentary committees, the 
AfD faction will receive around €16 million an-
nually to carry out its activities. In connection 
with the almost 6 million votes it garnered in the 
elections, it will also receive state subsidies (from 
83 euro-cents to 1 euro for each vote). The AfD 
is also hoping to get a portion of the €450 mil-
lion sum which Germany earmarks each year for 
funding the activities of political foundations. 
The AfD will also likely receive several extra-par-
liamentary offices; for example, representatives 
of the Bundestag sit on the management board 
of the KfW development bank, and on the su-
pervisory boards of Deutsche Welle and state-
controlled TV stations.
The AfD will be an uncompromising opposition 
party. During voting night, Alexander Gauland, 
one of the leaders of its election campaign, 
announced that they would “hunt Merkel”. 
The party leaders will emphasise that, unlike 
the SPD, they are not entangled in the system, 
a narrative which will be favourable for the par-
ty, and boost its credibility. Looking at the AfD’s 
actions to date, one may conclude that the lan-
guage of the public debate in Germany will be-
7 This has become particularly evident during the migrant 
crisis. See A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Filozof patrzy na kry-
zys migracyjny, Tygodnik Powszechny, 14 May 2016.
8 This is a reference to the slogan used in demonstrations 
held in the GDR from September 1989, during which the 
participants shouted ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (We are the na-
tion) and demanded political reforms.
The AfD’s presence in federal-level poli-
tics is no longer transitional. By now, the 
party has built a stable electorate and 
a strong intellectual power base.
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come more aggressive, and the narratives offe-
red by the AfD and the remaining parties will 
become increasingly divergent. It is already evi-
dent that in their attempts to prevent the AfD 
from spreading its influence at federal level, the 
remaining parties will resort to actions which 
are legal, yet infringe upon certain political tra-
ditions. For example, before the elections the 
Bundestag’s regulations were changed so that 
the representative of the right, Wilhelm von 
Gottberg, could not be elected president-senior 
of parliament and could not open the first ses-
sion. After the elections, the candidacy of Al-
brecht Glaser, whom the AfD had nominated to 
the office of vice-president of the Bundestag, 
was blocked. An SPD deputy, Michelle Müntefe-
ring, launched an initiative to collect signatu-
res from deputies to support a request to the 
council of senior parliamentarians to block the 
nomination of an AfD representative as head 
of the culture committee. The effectiveness of 
such actions is disputed, as it justifies the AfD’s 
theory of a conspiracy by the ‘old parties’ and 
the lack of ideology on the part of Christian De-
mocrats. At the same time, it compromises the 
prestige of the state’s institutions.
The AfD’s presence in federal-level politics is no 
longer transitional. By now, the party has built 
a stable electorate and a strong intellectual po-
wer base9. In the Bundestag, the AfD group is 
9 Research conducted in a socio-economic panel (SOEP) to 
measure long-term loyalty towards specific parties shows, 
among other things, that the AfD has managed to build 
a stable electorate of 5–6% (i.e. comparable to the av-
erage approval ratings of the FDP over many years, and 
much higher than the level of support for neo-Nazi parties 
such as the NPD or the DVU). For more see A. Ciechanow-
icz, AfD – the alternative for whom?, OSW Commentary, 
10 February 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2017-02-10/afd-alternative-whom
characterised by the highest proportion of in-
dividuals holding a doctor’s or professor’s title. 
Across Germany, the party is closely affiliated to 
conservative academic societies (Burschenscha-
ften). These elite male-only student societies, 
some of which have a history reaching back to 
1815, and whose membership is frequently re-
stricted only to ethnic Germans and Austrians, 
are a breeding ground for new members of the 
AfD10. Aside from swordsmanship and ritual ga-
mes, members of these societies are involved 
in organising education and childcare activities 
for fellow members, with special emphasis on 
knowledge of history, patriotism, and readiness 
to serve their homeland.
The ideological rift
The elections to the Bundestag have shown 
that to some degree the ideological divisions 
in Germany overlap the regional divisions. Abo-
ve all, an analysis of the election results reveals 
a long-standing division into east and west. In 
four (out of five) states of the former GDR, the 
AfD came second (in Brandenburg, Thuringia, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; 
in one state it was the victor (in Saxony). This 
suggests that the anti-immigrant slogans and 
the rhetoric centred on ethnicity met with 
a favourable response in this part of the coun-
try in particular. But not only there: similarly, 
support for the AfD was relatively high (al-
though not that high) in the southern part of 
Germany. In Bavaria as a whole, the AfD came 
third (with 12.4% of the votes, losing to the SPD 
by just 2.9%), but in 17 out of 46 constituen-
cies it came first and the SPD came second. In 
Baden-Wurttemberg, the AfD scored its second 
highest result in western Germany (12.2%). In 
northern states, the support for the AfD was 
less than 10%.
10 See: Leitmotive der Deutschen Burschenschaft, http://
www.burschenschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DB_Gr-
undsatzbroschuere-LANGTEXTE-KA3__08.01.15.pdf; 
Wie radikale Burschenschaften zur Kaderschmiede der 
AfD werden, 27 July 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.
de/2017/07/27/burschenschaften-afd-_n_17597626.html
The anti-immigrant slogans and the rhet-
oric centred on ethnicity have met with 
a favourable response in the former GDR 
in particular – but not only there.
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This distribution of votes indicates that the sup-
port for radical right-wing parties does not, 
as it has been assumed for years, result from 
the feeling of being less affluent than the re-
maining part of ‘rich’ Germany. Bavaria and Ba-
den-Wurttemberg are Germany’s second and 
third most affluent states respectively, and 73% 
of AfD voters assess their financial situation as 
good. By voting for the AfD, they intend to 
express their objection (85%) to the erosion of 
German culture, and to the far-reaching social 
changes caused by immigration and the exces-
sive influence of Islam11. This is confirmed in 
a report summing up research conducted by 
the Bertelsmann Foundation, which suggests 
that the traditional establishment parties have 
not only lost those voters who have right-wing 
views, but also are affected by a massive out-
flow of urban voters who support the political 
centre. The voting choices made by the mem-
bers of this group are increasingly less influ-
11 A poll regarding the biggest threats Germany needs to 
tackle according to AfD voters: Bundestagswahl 2017. 
Umfragen zur AfD, 24 September 2017, https://wahl.
tagesschau.de/wahlen/2017-09-24-BT-DE/charts/um-
frage-afd/chart_208795.shtml
enced by their profession and religion12. The 
AfD’s presence in the Bundestag results from 
the emergence of a division line which determi-
nes one’s attitude towards the nation, history, 
the state and culture. In the present parliamen-
tary term, we will witness an ideological fight 
which will be transmitted by the national TV 
stations. As a consequence, the public mood is 
likely to become increasingly heated and pola-
rised. Taking account of the fact that political 
opponents in Germany are inclined to use in-
creasingly aggressive language, and to move 
their disputes to the streets (for example the 
protests against the G20 summit in Hamburg, 
the attacks on refugee centres), Germany will 
need to tackle the growing radicalisation of re-
presentatives of both the left and right wings 
of the political scene.
12 The authors of the report symbolically divide this group 
of voters into supporters and opponents of ‘modernisa-
tion’. For the enthusiasts of ‘progress’ the key words are: 
the environment, openness, multiculturalism, humanity. 
The opponents emphasise the value of tradition, na-
tion and German culture. R. Vehrkamp, K. Wegschaid-
er, Populaere Wahlen. Mobilisierung und Gegenmobi-
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MAP
The percentage of votes cast for the AfD in specific federal states during the elections to the Bundestag. 
24 September 2017
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